Michael S. Robinson, Petitioner/Appellant vs. Debra J. Robinson, Respondent/Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) 
2014 
Michael S. Robinson, Petitioner/Appellant vs. Debra J. Robinson, 
Respondent/Appellee 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. 
Recommended Citation 
Reply Brief, Robinson v. Robinson, No. 20130652 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2014). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3094 
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. 
Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/








IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
lvllCHAEL s~ ROBINSON, 
· Petitioner/ Appellant 
vs. 














APPELLANT'S REPLY B~F ·. 
Appellate Case No. 20130652 
Trial Court No. 074900501 · 1 • 
THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM THE TillRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STAIB OF UTAH 
Dean C. Andreasen (3981) 
Diana L. Telfer (10654) 
CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216 
Telephone (801) 322 2516 
Facsimile (801) 521-6280 
dca(@clydesnow.com 
dlt@clydesnow.com 
Attorneys for Respondent/ Appellee 
F. Kevin Bond (5093) 
Budge W. Call (5047) 
BOND & CALL, L.C. 
8 East Broadway, Suite 720 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 521-8900 
Facsimile (801) 521-9700 
kbondc@bondcall-law.com 
bcall@bondcall-law.com 
Attorneys for Petitioner/ Appellant 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
SEP 2 4 201\ 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MICHAEL S. ROBINSON, 
Petitioner/ Appellant 
vs. 













APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appellate Case No. 20130652 
Trial Court No. 074900501 
THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Dean C. Andreasen (3981) 
Diana L. Telfer (10654) 
CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216 
Telephone (801) 322 2516 
Facsimile (801) 521-6280 
dca(@clydesnow.com 
dlt@clydesnow.com 
Attorneys for Respondent/ Appellee 
F. Kevin Bond (5093) 
Budge W. Call (5047) 
BOND & CALL, L.C. 
8 East Broadway, Suite 720 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 521-8900 
Facsimile (801) 521-9700 
kbond(@bondcall-law.com 
bcall@bondcall-law.com 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................... ~ ........... ~ ....... iii 
SUMMARY OF ARGlJMENT ..................................... · ......... 1 
ARGlJMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING A $1.9 MILLION· · 
JUDGMENT AS A PROPERTY DISTRUBUTION BASED ON 
MICHAEL'S ALLEGED CONTEMPT. 4 
II. MICHAEL IS ENTITLED TO RAISE THE ISSUE THAT HE 
DID NOT HA VE THE ABILITY TO COMPLY WITH THE 
COURT'S ORDER IN DEFENSE TO HIS ALLEGED 
CONTEMPT. · 7 
III. ROBINSON I DOES NOT PRECLUDE MICHAEL FROM 
RAISING MISTAKE OR IMPOSSIBILITY AS A DEFENSE 
TO HIS ALLEGED CONTEMPT. 8 
IV. MICHAEL SHOULD NOT BE PRECLUDED FROM RAISING 
FRAUD AS A DEFENSE TO HIS ALLEGED CONTEMPT. 12 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
ENFORCING TERMS THAT WERE OBVIOUSLY NO 
LONGER FAIR AND EQUITABLE. 13 
VI. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE 
LIS PENDENS FILED UNDER A SEPARATE LAWSUIT 
WERE "WRONGFUL LIENS" UNDER UTAH'S WRONGFUL 
LIEN STATUTE. 15 
VII. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS AW ARD OF COSTS 
AND ATTORNEYS' FEES INCURRED IN THE MATTER. 17 
CONCLUSION ........................................................ 19 
11 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Utah Cases: 
Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P .2d 622 (Utah 1985) .................................. 18 
Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782 (Ut. App. 1987) ................•........ · ... 3, 14 
@ Connell v. Connell, 2010 UT App 139, 2~3 P.3d 836 ................... ~ ...... 18, 19 
Eldridge v. Farnsworth, 2007 UT .. App 243, 166 P.3d 639 ........................ 15 
Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, 299 P.3d 1079 .......................... 1, 6, 7, 14 
Hoymere v. Stagg & Assoc., 2006 UT App 89, 132 P.3d 684 ..................... ~ 6 
Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, 16 P.3d 1214 .......... 2, 10, 12 
Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080, 1082 (Utah 1977) ...................... ~. 3, 14 
Pierce v. Pierce, 2000 UT 7, 994 P.2d 193 .................................... 16 
State v. Hurst, 821 P.2d 467 (Ut. App. 1991) ................................... 9 
State ex rel. A.C.M, 2009 UT 30, 221 P.3d 185 ............................. 10, 12 
Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, 176 P.3d 476 ..................... 14 
Van Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988) ......................... 1, 7, 9, 11 
@ Winters v. Schulman, 1999 UT App 119,977 P.2d 1218 .......................... 16 
Zufelt v. Haste, Inc. 2006 UT App 326, 142 P.3d 594 ....................... 2, 11, 13 
Cases from other Jurisdictions: 
Levinson v. Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 857 P.2d 18 (Nev. 1993) ........ 16 
111 
Utah Rules and Statutes: 
Section 30-3-3(1), Utah Code Ann .......................................... 3, 17 
Section 30-3-3(2), Utah Code Ann ............................ ; ......... 3, 18, 19 
· _Section 38-9-1(6)(a), Utah Code Ann........... . ........................... 16 
. . 
Section 38-9-2(2), Utah Code Ann .................................... 3, 15, 16, 17 @ 
Section 78B-6-301, Utah Code Ann ..................................... ·.· ...... 7 
Section 78B-6-1303, Utah Code Ann .................................... 3, 15, 17 
Section 78B-6-1304(1)(2), Utah Code Ann ................................ 3, 16, 17 
Statutes of Central Importance: 
Section 3 8-9-1 & 2~ Utah Code Ann ......................... Addendum, Exhibit A 
Section 78B-6-1303 & 1304, Utah Code Ann .................. Addendum, Exhibit B 
Section 30-3-3, Utah Code Ann ............................. Addendum, Exhibit C 
Addendum: ® 
A. Utah's Wrongful Lien Statute, Sections 38-9-1 & 2, Utah Code Ann. 
B. Lis Pendens Statute, Section 78B-6-1303 & 1304, Utah Code Ann. 
C. Attorneys' Fee Statute, Section 30-3-3, Utah Code Ann. 
D. Judgment and Order, dated Feb. 25, 2011. (Rec. 1213-1222) 
IV 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Michael was not required to pay Debra $1.9 million under the terms of the-
Stipulation ( or Decree) until Phoenix Plaza was refinanced, which it never was. Also, the 
$1.9 million judgment was not entered based on the terms of the Stipulation (or Decree); 
@ but rather, as a punishment for Michael's alleged contempt in failingto file an application 
to refinance Phoenix Plaza within 15 days of the parties' Stipulation. The trial court 
abused its discretion by imposing such a sanction, beyond any actual injury caused by the 
alleged contempt, in an attempt to distribute the marital property as a punishment for 
Michael's alleged contempt. Goggin v. Goggin 2013 UT 16, il 52,299 P.3d 1079. 
Furthermore, the Stipulation was entered into on November 2, 2007; but the 
court order (Divorce Decree) was not entered until December 31, 2008. Therefore, after 
the court order was entered it was impossible for Michael to comply with its terms and file 
Ii> an application to refinance Phoenix Plaza within 15 days of the Stipulation. 
Michael is not trying to reargue the same defense of impossibility to set aside 
the Stipulation, but rather his inability to comply with the court's order in defense to his 
alleged contempt. Michael is entitled to raise this issue in defense of his alleged contempt 
to show that he did not have the ability to comply with the court's order. Van Hake v. 
Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988). 
Robinson I was the appeal of the trial court's denial of Michael's earlier 
motion to have the Stipulation set aside for the contractual defenses of mistake and 
impossibility. Debra admits that Robinson I was decided before contempt was even raised 
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in this case. (Appellee's Brief pg. 17) Therefore, the Utah Court of Appeals in Robinson I 
did not deal with Michael's alleged contempt; the entry of a $1.9 million judgment based 
on his alleged contempt; and did not rule that impossibility would not be available to -
Michael as a defense to any future allegations of contempt. 
Moreover, claim preclusion does not bar Michael from raising mistake, 
impossibility .or-fraud, in defense to his alleged contempt, because these claims did not;-
arise until after the divorce action was filed; and therefore, they are not claims that "should. 
have been raised" for res judicata purposes. Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Irie., 
2000 UT 93, 16 P.3d 1214. Moreover since these claims were not raised in Robinson I, 
there has been no final judgment on the merits of these claims. 
Issue preclusion does not apply because the identical issues, in defense to 
Michael's alleged contempt, were never previously raised or litigated. The elements 
Michael had to prove to set aside the Stipulation based on mistake or impossibility are far 
different than the requirements Debra needs to prove for a finding of contempt. Also, the 
burden of proof shifts from Michael to Debra and the level of proof required is a higher 
clear and convincing standard. Therefore, the identical issues in defense to Michael's 
alleged contempt were never "completely, fully and fairly litigated;" and there has been not 
been a final judgment entered on the merits of these defenses for issue preclusion to apply. 
Zufelt v. Haste, Inc. 2006 UT App 326, 19, 142 P.3d 594. 
In Robinson I there was no determination made by this Court that the final 





reviewed in Robinson I valued Phoenix Plaza at $7 .25 million. Afterwards, it was 
determined that Phoenix Plaza was not worth $7 .25 million and the divorce court ordered it 
sold for $3 million. To keep the division equal between the parties the divorce court 
should have lowered the parties' equity in Phoenix Plaza accordingly; and lowered the 
@ amount Michael owed Debra for her equity in the Plaza, which unjustly remained at $ L9 . · 
million based on the over-estimated value of $7.25 million. Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 
782, 789 (Ut. App. 1987); Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P .2d 1080, 1082 (Utah 1977). 
As for the wrongful liens;Utah's Wrongful Lien Statute under §38-9-2(2) 
has an explicit exception for a lis pendens filed under §78B-6-1303. There was an action 
pending in the West Jordan court, at the time the lis pendens were filed, which made a 
claim affecting the real property at issue in this case. Therefore, the lis pendens cannot be 
defined as "wrongful liens" under Utah's Wrongful Lien Statute. Furthermore, it is the 
@ West Jordan court, in the underlying action, that should have decided whether to remove 
the lis pendens, after making a finding pursuant to §78B-6-1304(2) as to the probable 
validity of the real property claim contained in the pending action. Such a finding was 
never made by the West Jordan court or the divorce court in this action. 
Finally, in regards to the attorneys' fees, the trial court in its Findings of Pact 
and Conclusions ofLaw did not make any findings as to Debra's needs or Michael's ability 
to pay, to award attorneys' fees under §30-3-3(1). Furthermore, the trial court and did not 
make any findings as to who the prevailing party was on the enforcement issues heard at 
the April 2013 trial, to award attorneys' fees either under contact or under §30-3-3(2). 
'l 
.J 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING A $1.9 MILLION 
JUDGMENT AS A PROPERTY DISTRUBUTION BASED ON 
MICHAEL'S ALLEGED CONTEMPT. 
, Although Michael was unable to have-the Stipulation set aside based on··the 
contractual defenses· of mistake arid impossibility, according to the terms and language. in · 
the Stipulation, Michael was not to pay Debra $1.9 million until after Phoenix Plaza was 
refinanced,· which never occurred. The consequence set forth in the · Stipulation ( and 
Decree) for Michael's failure to refinance Phoenix Plaza was not the payment of$ 1.9 
million to Debra, but rather the payment' of interest at 8 % to commence after 120 days. 
(See Stipulation 116B, Rec. 18-19; Exhibit B to Michael's initial Brief) 
In fact, after Debra filed her Motion for Order to Show Cause to enforce the 
$1.9 million payment, Commissioner Evans ruled that the language in the Decree did not 
trigger the payment or an award for the principal amounts involved [the $1.9 million], but 
that the principal amounts are not due and owing until the refinancing of Phoenix Plaza 
occurs, or perhaps as a sanction following a finding of contempt. (See Trans. of Jan. 13, 
2013 hearing, Rec. 7553, pg. 36, lines 5-11, Exhibit C to Michael's initial Brief; and the 
Judgment and Order, dated Feb. 25, 2011, 110; Rec. 1213-1217; attached hereto as 
Addendum Ex. D) Therefore, the Commissioner did not rule that a judgment for $1.9 
million should be entered against Michael based on the language in the Stipulation ( or 
Decree) as fashioned by the parties. 
The Judgment Judge Iwasaki entered against Michael for $1.9 million was 
also not based on Michael's failure to pay Debra $1.9 million under the language of the 
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Stipulation (or Decree); but rather was due to Michael's alleged contempt in failing to 
refinance Phoenix Plaza. 
Judge Iwa~aki, during.the July 26, 2011 hearing, stated that he was going to 
enter judgment against Michael for-$1.9miJlion based ~n Michael's contempt. (See trans. 
@ from the July 26;2011 hearing, Rec. 7554, pgs. 25-26; Rec. 7093; Exhibit D-to Michael'.s 
initial Brief) At the conclusion of the July 26, 2011 hearing, Judge Iwasaki stat~d as 
follows, "[a]ll _right, First things first. As to the.$1.9 plus million judgment for that, [the] 
court finds the defendant [sic] in contempt." (See Trans. July 26, 2011 hearing, Rec. 7554, 
pg. 31, lines 3.-6; Exhibit D to Michael's initi~l Brief)~ Therefore, Judge Iwasaki did not 
enter the $1.9 million Judgment based on the language in the Stipulation (or Decree) as 
fashioned by the parties; but rather based on Michael's alleged contempt. (See Trans. July 
26, 2011 hearing, Rec. 7554, pg. 25, lines 1-18; Ex. D to Michael's initial Brief). Judge 
@ Shaughnessy realized this and had his doubts about whether such a judgment could be 
entered in a contempt proceeding, but declined to go back and try to fix it. (Trans. May 23, 
2012 Ruling, Rec. 7563, pg. 11-16; also Rec. 5623-56i8) 
@ 
Robinson I involved the appeal of the trial court's denial of Michael's earlier 
attempt to have the Stipulation set aside for the contractual defenses of mistake and 
impossibility; and occurred, as Debra puts it, "before contempt was even raised as an 
issue." (Appellee's Brief pg. 17) Robinson I was decided before Debra filed her Order to 
Show Cause Motion and before there were any rulings regarding Michael's alleged 
contempt. Therefore, Robinson I did not deal with Michael's alleged contempt; or the 
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entry of a $1.9 million judgment based on Michael's alleged contempt. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Goggin v. Goggin 2013 UT 16, ,r 52,299 P.3d 
1079, stated that "although a court has considerable discretion in determining whether to 
sanction a party, it does not have discretion to impose a sanction beyond the actual 
injury caused by the contemptuous behavior. Moreover, it does not have discretion 
to distribute marital property in a way that is designed to punish a party's 
contemptuous behavior." Id at ,r 52 (emphasis added). This is clearly what happened to 
Michael in this case; and the $1.9 million Judgment should be reversed. 
The $1.9 million-Judgment entered against Michael, in this case, was.for his 
alleged contempt in failing to timely submit a loan application to refinance a piece of 
martial property, Phoenix Plaza, which didn't qualify anyway; while in Goggin, the 
husband's contempt was much more egregious, such as concealing marital assets and 
repeated violations of the court's orders. Yet, the Utah Supreme Court in Goggin held 
that the divorce court exceeded its discretion by imposing sanctions beyond the actual 
injury cause by the husband's contempt and that while the husband may have engaged in 
contemptuous conduct, even to the extent of concealing and dissipating marital assets and 
violating the court's orders; this did not entitle the court to enter a monetary judgment 
against the husband based on his contempt, beyond the actual injury caused by his 
contempt, nor did the husband's contempt relieve the court of its equitable duty to see that 
there was a fair and equitable distribution of the parties' marital property. Id. at ,r 53. 
See also Hoymere v. Stagg & Assoc., 2006 UT App 89, ,r,r 7, 9, 132 P.3d 684, where a 
6 
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monetary judgment for $116,181.76 was reversed, because damages in a contempt 
proceeding are limited to the actual loss or injury caused by the contempt, and are not to be 
used to award damages to satisfy the underlying claim. 
In this case, Michael's failure to file a loan application on Phoenix Plaza 
@ within 15 days did not cause the loss of the property or damages anywhere near-$1.9 
million. The parties retained the property, until it was ordered sold by the divorce court. 
The $1.9 million amount is beyond any actual loss caused by Michael's alleged contempt. 
It was entered as a distribution of marital property designed to punish Michael for his 
alleged contempt; and should be reversed. Goggin at, 52. 
II. MICHAEL IS ENTITLED TO RAISE THE ISSUE THAT HE 
DID NOT HA VE THE ABILITY TO COMPLY WITH THE 
COURT'S ORDER IN DEFENSE TO HIS ALLEGED 
CONTEMPT. 
Michael is not trying to reargue the contractual defense of impossibility to set 
aside the Stipulation; but rather, that he did not have the ability to comply with the court's 
order when it was entered. For a party to be found in contempt there must be a court order 
in existence, and it must be shown that the party ( 1) knew what was required of him by the 
order, (2) had the ability to comply with the order, and (3) willfully failed and refused to 
do so. Van Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988). 
Michael was found in contempt for failing to make a loan application to 
refinance Phoenix Plaza, within 15 days of the Nov. 2, 2007 Stipulation. However, a 
stipulation is not a court order and Utah's contempt statute, §78B-6-301, does not authorize 
7 
a finding of contempt for breach of contractual obligations. This provision in the parties' 
Stipulation did not become a court order 1:1ntil over a year later.on December 31, 2008, 
when the Decree of Divorce.was entered. (Rec. 676-689} Thus, at the time the Decree 
was entered on December 31., 2008, Michael did not have the ability to comply with this•. 
provision of the court's order because the 15 day period to make the loan application had 
already passed. As a result, the second requirement necessary for a finding of contempt . 
cannot be met in this case. Thus, the trial court erred in holding Michael in contempt of 
the Decree entered Dec. 31, 2008, by failing to make a loan application by Nov. 17,2007. 
Again Robinson I was the appeal of the trial court's denial of Michael's 
earlier attempt to have the Stipulation set aside for the contractual defenses of mistake and 
impossibility; before Debra filed her Order to Show Cause Motion and the issue of 
contempt was raised in this case. Therefore, the issue of contempt and Michael's ability . 
to comply with the court's order was not ruled on by this Court in Robinson I. 
III. ROBINSON I DOES NOT PRECLUDE MICHAEL FROM 
RAISING MISTAKE OR IMPOSSIBILITY AS A DEFENSE 
TO HIS ALLEGED CONTEMPT. 
The Court of Appeals in Robinson I ruled that the contractual defenses of 
mistake and impossibility are not applicable under the facts of this case. The issue of 
contempt was not before the Court of Appeals in Robinson I; and the Court of Appeals did 
not rule that the defenses of mistake or impossibility would not be available to Michael on 
any future allegations of contempt. Michael is entitled to raise these defenses to show that 
he did not have the ability to comply with the court's order; the second requirement for a 
8 
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finding of contempt. Van Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988) 
The Court of Appeals in Robinson I did not say that "asking for the deal to be 
fair 'in hindsight' is not a defense to contempt," as represented by Debra (Appellee's Brief · 
. pg. 20); rather the Court said that asking for the deal to be fair "in hindsight". is·µot grounds.: 
@ for rescission. (See Opinion, 111; Rec. 709} There are different requirements for a· · 
finding of.contempt than to rescind a contract based on the contractual.defenses :of mistake : 
or impossibility. For a finding of contempt it must be proven that an order was in 
existence, and that Michael (1) knew what was required of him by the order; (2) had the 
ability to comply with the court's order; and (3) intentionally failed or refused to act. 
Van Hake v. Thomas,. 759 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988). Thus, mistake and impossibility . 
are defenses that should be available to Michael to show that he did not have the ability to 
comply with the court's order. 
· Furthermore, Michael's burden to prove the contractual defenses of mistake 
or impossibility, is different than Debra's burden to prove contempt. The burden of proof 
shifts from Michael to Debra and is a higher "clear and convincing evidence" standard for 
a finding of civil contempt. State v. Hurst, 821 P.2d 467,471 (Ut. App. 1991). In short, 
the elements required for Michael to set aside a contract based on mistake or impossibility 
are different than what is required by Debra to prove contempt. Moreover, the burden of 
proof shifts to Debra and is a higher clear and convincing standard. 
Q 
.., 
Res judicata does not prevent Michael from raising these claims as a defense 
in the contempt proceedings because all the elements for res judicata have not been met. 
Claim preclusion has three requirements: ( 1) both cases must involve the same parties or 
their privies; (2) the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the _first_ 
suit or must be one that could and should have been raised in the first action; and (3) 
the-first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. State:ex rel: A.-C.M, 2009 
UT 30, ,r 17,221 P.3d 185 (Utah 2009). In regards to the second requirement, the Utah 
Supreme Court in Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, 16 P.3d 1214, 
has ruled that a party is required to include claims in an action for res judicata purposes 
only if those claims arose before the filing of the complaint in the earlier action. Id. at ,r 25. 
The claims as to Michael's alleged contempt, in this case, obviously arose after the action 
was filed and the court's order was entered. Therefore, the second element for claim 
preclusion has not been met. 1 
Issue preclusion does not prevent Michael from raising the claims of mistake 
or impossibility to the contempt charges. Issue preclusion has four requirements ( 1) the 
party. against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have been a party or privy with a 
party in the prior adjudication; (2) the issue decided in the prior adjudication must be 
identical to the one presented in the instant action; (3) the issue in the first action must 
1 Michael could not have raised these issues as to the contempt charges before this Court's 
ruling in Robinson I because the issue of contempt had not been raised at that point; 
therefore, Robinson I, is not a final judgment on these issues and the third requirement for 
claim preclusion has not been met. 
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have been completely, fully and fairly litigated; and ( 4) the prior suit must have resulted in 
a judgment on the merits. Zufelt v. Haste, Inc. 2006 UT App 326, ,r 9, 142 P.3d 594. 
Again, the contractual defenses of mistake or impossibility to set aside the Stipulation, 
· which Michael must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, are different than the . 
@ requirements that Debra must prove by clear and convincing evidence to establish 
Michael's contempt, which includes Michael's ability to comply with the courts' order. 
Therefore, the issues previously decided on Michael's motion to set aside the Stipulation 
based on the contractual defenses of mistake and impossibility, are not identical to the 
issue that Debra must prove by clear and convincing evidence, that Michael had the ability 
to comply with the court's order, for a finding of contempt. Furthermore, the defenses to 
@ 
Michael's alleged contempt were not "completely, fully and fairly" litigated; and there has 
been no final judgment entered on the merits of these defense for issue preclusion to apply. 
Robinson I is also not determinative as to whether Michael should have been 
able to present evidence from Mr. Gotschall and Mr. Wadley to show that he did not have 
the ability to refinance Phoenix Plaza, in compliance with the court's order, as a defense to 
the contempt charges; since Robinson I involved the contractual defenses of mistake and 
impossibility and not contempt. Moreover, when the alleged contemptuous conduct 
occurs outside the presence of the judge (as in this case) due process requires that a hearing 
be held; and the party accused has the right to counsel, to confront witnesses, and to offer 
testimony on his behalf. Van Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988). 
11 
IV. MICHAEL SHOULD NOT BE PRECLUDED FROM RAISING 
FRAUD AS A DEFENSE TO HIS ALLEGED CONTEMPT. 
The doctrine of res judicata also does not preclude Michael from raising 
fraud in defense to the contempt charges. Claim preclusion has three elements: (1) both 
cases must involve the same parties or their privies; (2) the claim that is alleged to be 
barred must have been presented in the first suit or must be one that could and should 
have been raised in the first action; and (3) the first suit must have resulted in a final 
judgment on the merits. State ex rel. A.C.M, 2009 UT 30, ,r 17,221 P.3d 185. 
Again, in regards to the second requirement, the Utah Supreme Court in 
Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, 16 P.3d 1214, has ruled that a party 
is required to include claims in an action for res judicata purposes only if those claims arose 
before the filing of the complaint in the earlier action. Id. at ,r 25. The allegations of 
Debra's fraud, particularly in relation to the Stipulation entered into after the case was 
filed, obviously occurred after this action was filed. 
Furthermore, Michael could not have raised the issue of fraud as a defense to 
the contempt charges in Robinson I, because Debra did not file her Order to Show Cause 
and contempt was not raised as an issue until after Robinson I. (Appellee's Brief pg. 17) 
Therefore, it was not an issue that could have been raised to meet the second requirement of 
claim preclusion; and there has been no final judgment entered on the merits of this claim 
in relation to the alleged contempt, to meet the third requirement of claim preclusion. 
12 
@ 
Issue preclusion has four requirements: (1) the party against whom issue 
preclusion is asserted must have been a party or privy with a party in the prior adjudication; 
(2) the issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one presented in the 
instant action; (3) the issue in the first action must have been completely, fully and fairly 
@ litigated; and ( 4) the prior suit must have resulted in a judgment on the merits. Zufelt v .. 
Haste, Inc. 2006 UT App 326, if 9, 142 P.3d 594. 
Issue preclusion does not bar Michael from raising fraud in defense to the 
alleged contempt. Debra argues that allegations of fraud were raised after the Stipulation 
was entered into to set it aside, but were never raised on appeal in Robinson I. However, 
the issue as to whether fraud may be a defense to set aside the Stipulation is not identical to 
the one presented in the instance action, i.e. using fraud as a defense to the contempt 
charges that were later brought against Michael. Therefore, the issues are not identical 
Gi) for issue preclusion to apply. Furthermore, since contempt was not even an issue before 
Robinson I; the defense of fraud to the contempt charges could not have been "completely, 
fully and fairly litigated" in Robinson I; and Robinson I is not a final judgment on the 
merits of this defense for issue preclusion to apply. 
@ 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
ENFORCING TERMS THAT WERE OBVIOUSLY NO 
LONGER FAIR AND EQUITABLE. 
The Court of Appeals in Robinson I did not make any finding that the terms 
of the Stipulation were fair and reasonable, but rather assumed from the district court's 
enforcement that the lower court had determined that the property division was fair and 
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equitable. Furthermore, this assessment was according to the terms of the Stipulation in 
which the parties valued Phoenix Plaza (a major marital asset) at $7.25 million. The 
payment amounts provided under the Stipulation were based on Phoenix Plaza having a 
value of $7 .25 million, giving the parties a substantial amount of equity ,in the property. 
It became apparent after the Stipulation was entered into that Phoenix. Plaza 
was not worth $7 .25 million. It did not qualify- for refinancing or loans of $3 .5 million.· 
Although the Stipulation may have failed to provide for such a contingency, the divorce 
court is not bound by the parties' prior agreement, particularly when it no longer provides 
for a fair and equitable distribution of the marital property. Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 
782, 789 (Ut. App. 1987); see also Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080, 1082 (Utah 1977) 
(the divorce court is not bound by the terms of the litigant's stipulation; but may make 
changes, as necessary, for the protection and welfare of the parties). Furthermore, the 
divorce court has an affirmative duty to assign the proper value to each item of marital 
property; and to see that the final division is equal, in what it believes to be a fair and 
equitable distribution.2 Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ,I 15, 176 P.3d 476. 
This is true even if one of the parties has been found to be in contempt. Goggin v. Goggin, 
2013 UT 16, ,I 53,299 P.3d 1079 (husband's contempt did not relieve the court of its duty 
to see that there was a fair and equitable distribution of the parties' marital property). 
2 There were no findings entered in this case, as required, or ruling, that the marital 
property should not be divided equally. Stonehocker at ,I 15 
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The trial court in this case failed to see that the final division was a fair and 
equitable distribution of the parties' marital property; or anything that could be considered 
a fair and equitable "distribution. · For instance, when Phoenix Plaza, originally valued at• . 
$7 .25 million in the Stipulation, was ordered sold by the court for $3 million (Rec. 1214 ); 
@· an adjustment should have been made accordingly to reduce the parties' equity in the Plaza.-
and to lower the amount Michael was required to pay Debra for her equity in the Plaza. 3 
This was not done; as a result, the ordered sale of Phoenix Plaza for $3 million took $4 .25, 
million away from Michael, while Debra's claim for her equity in the Plaza unjustly 
remained at $1.9 million, based on the over-estimated value of $7 .25 million. -
VI. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE 
LIS PENDENS FILED UNDER A SEPARATE LAWSUIT 
W·ERE "WRONGFUL LIENS" UNDER UTAH'S WRONGFUL · 
LIEN STATUTE. 
Utah's Wrongful Lien Statute §38-9-2(2) provides that, "[t]he provision of 
this chapter shall not prevent a person from filing a lis pendens in accordance with Section 
78B-6-1303." 
In Eldridge v. Farnsworth, 2007 UT App 243, 1147-49, 166 P.3d 639, the 
Utah Court of Appeals held that the filing of a lis pendens did not constitute a wrongful lien 
because of the explicit exception in §38-9-2(2); and because the lis pendens was expressly 
authorized by state statute, it fell within the exception of the "wrongful lien" definition in 
3 Robinson I is not determinative on this issue because Robinson I was decided before 
Phoenix Plaza, originally valued at $7.25 million in the Stipulation, was ordered sold by 
the trial court for $3 million. (Rec. 1214) 
15 
§38-9-1(6)(a). The court in this action failed to follow the plain unambiguous language of 
§38-9-2(2) which specifically exempts the filing of a lis pendens from the scope of Utah's 
Wrongful Lien Statute. 
Furthermore, the validity of the lis.·pendens should have been decided by the 
West Jordan court after making a finding pursuant to §78B-6-1304(2) as to the probable 
validity of the real property claim contained in the pending action. In .this case, there · 
wasn't a finding by the West Jordan court, or the divorce court, as to the validity of the real 
property claim contained in the pending action in West Jordan. (Rec. 4368-4370) 
Wintersv. Schulman, 1999 UT App 119, 977 P.2d 1218, is not applicable to 
the facts in this case. Winters involved a divorce in California and unlike this case, there 
was no action currently pending in California at the time the lis pendens was filed; and the 
divorce action that was filed, did not make any claim to the real property located in Utah. 
In this case, an action was pending in the West Jordan court, at the time the lis pendens 
were filed, which did make a claim affecting title to, or the right of possession, of the real 
property at issue. In Utah, an action for a "constructive trust" can affect title to real 
property or the right of possession. Pierce v. Pierce, 2000 UT 7,, 5, 994 P.2d 193. The 
Nevada court in Levinson v. Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 857 P.2d 18 (Nev. 
1993) actually stated that "lis pendens are not appropriate instruments for use in promoting 
recoveries in actions for personal injury or money judgments." Id. at 20. 
Finally, use of the term "may" in §78B-6-1304(1) is permissive only to the 
extent that a party "may" but is not required to make a motion. If a person does elect to 
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make a motion to have the lis pendens removed under §78B-6-1304(1), it should be made 
to the court in which the action is pending. Regardless, as whether this applies to the 
judge, or the district; under subsection (2), the court in which the motion is made, is to 
make a finding by a preponderance of the evidence asto the probable·validity of the real 
@ · property claim contained in the action, and that did not occur in this case. by either court .. 
(Rec. 4368-4370) 
In short, a lis pendens cannot be a "wrongful lien" as defined under Utah's . 
Wrongful Lien Statute, because the filing of a lis pendens under §78B-6.;.1303 is explicitly 
exempt from Utah's Wrongful Lien Statute under §28-9-2(2). Eldridge v. Farnsworth, 
2007 UT App 243, ,r,r 47-49, 166 P.3d 639 
VII. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS AW ARD OF COSTS 
AND ATTORNEYS' FEES INCURRED IN THE MATTER. 
Debra claims that §30-3-3(1) should not be applied in this case because her 
attorneys' fees were incurred only to enforce the court's orders, resulting from Michael's 
recalcitrance. However, this is not the case. The Stipulation and Decree provide that the 
parties shall jointly manage the properties. (Stipulation ,r 16D; Rec. 19) This was later 
changed solely to Debra who was to provide Michael a monthly accounting. Furthermore 
the income from Phoenix Plaza was to be used to pay the expenses on the other properties 
@ and the net excess was to be divided as agreed by the parties. The trial held in April 2013 
involved more than just enforcement issues against Michael. It included an accounting 
and reconciliation from Debra in order to reach a final distribution of the parties' martial 
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income and properties (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, May, 29, 2013, ,r,r 17, 
18, 19, 20, 21 & 22; Rec. 6879-6883; also attached as Addendum Ex. D to Michael's initial 
Brief); and resulted in a modification of the court?s prior order. (Id. at if 20; Rec. 6882) 
The trial Off these issues.was not required because of Michael's recalcitrance~ but to 
perform an equalizing.function; therefore, the provisions of §30-3-3( 1) .should apply to the 
fees incurred on these issues . 
. Regardless,- even under §30-3.-3(2) which provides for attorneys' fees upon a .. 
determination that "the party substantially prevailed upon the claim or·defense;" the trial 
court in this case, failed to make any finding at the conclusion of the April 2013 trial, that 
Debra substantially prevailed upon any claim or defense. To allow meaningful appellate 
review the trial court needs to make detailed findings as to who the prevailing party was on 
the claims presented.4 Connell v. Connell, 2010 UT App 139, ,i 27, 233 P.3d 836. 
Debra argues that she substantially prevailed on every issue at the April 2013 
trial; however, the trial court did not make such a finding.5 Furthermore, the trial court in 
its July 12, 2013 Minute Entry indicates that Debra was not successful on all the issues at 
the April 2013 trial. Finally, the trial court failed to make detailed findings as to the 
matters on which Debra substantially prevailed. In Connell the trial court looked at the 
"overall success" of the wife in awarding her attorneys' fees. This award was reversed 
4 This is also true when the prevailing party seeks attorneys' fees based on a written 
contract. Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P .2d 622, 624 (Utah 1985) 
5 Actually it can be argued that the April 2013 trial ended more favorable for Michael than 
Debra, as Debra already had a $1.9 million judgment entered against Michael, which was 
reduced after the April 2013 trial, to $1,128,948.62. (See Rec. 6883-6884) 
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and the matter was remanded to the trial court, with instructions that if a fee award is based 
on §30-3-3(2) it should be supported by a finding that the wife substantially prevailed on 
the motions for which she seeks attorneys' fees. Id. at, 32. 
The trial court's ruling on post-trial issues; relates to supplemental.and 
i) post-judgment proceedings after the April 13, 2013 trial, which occurred after this appeal 
was filed.. They do not relate to the April 13 2103 trial or the attorneys' fees awarded in 
the Final Order and Judgment of May 29, 2013, which are under appeal in this case. 
Finally, Michael prevailed on substantially all of the contempt issues atthe 
April 2013 trial. (Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law, May 29, 2013, ,, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,-
11 & 12, Rec. 6875-6878) Therefore, if attorneys' fees are to be awarded under 
§30-3-3(2) or under contract; it is Michael, as the prevailing party, who is entitled to his 
attorneys' fees, incurred on defending these issues. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the forgoing, the rulings and judgments of the lower court should 
be reversed; and the case remanded to the lower court, with instructions to see that an equal 
distribution of the marital property is made, which is fair and equitable, for both parties. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITED, this4 day of September, 2014. 
BOND & CALL, L.C. 
~ .. h.J.~~ < 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
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38-8-4 LIENS 818 
certified mail, postage prepaid, to the occupant's last known 
address that states: 
(a) the date the vehicle was towed; and 
(b) the address and telephone number of the person 
that towed the vehicle. 
(3) An owner that has a vehicle towed under Subsection (1) 
is not liable for any damage that occurs to the vehicle aft_er the 
independent towing carrier takes possession of the vehicle. 
2013 
38-8-4. Posting of notice . . 
Each owner acting under this chapter shall keep posted m a 
prominent place in the owner's office al all times a notice that 
reads as follows: 
"All articles stored under a rental agreement, for which 
charges have not been paid for 30 days, will be sold to pay 
charges. If this business does not sell a vehicle stored under a 
rental agreement, it will be towed from the self-storage facility 
after 60 days of nonpayment." 2013 
38-8-5. Other liens unaffected. 
Nothing in this section shall be construed as in any manner 
impairing or affecting the right of parties to create liens by 
special contract or agreement, nor shall it in any manner 
affect or impair other liens arising at common law or in equity, 
or by any statute of this state. 1981 
CHAPTER9 












County recorder may reject wrongful lien within 
scope of employment - Good faith requiremen t. 
Civil liability for recording wrongful lien - Dam-
ages. 
Repealed. 
Petition to file lien - Notice to record interest 
holders - Summary relief - Contested petition. 
Petition to nullify lien - Notice to lien claimant -
Summary relief - Finding of wrongful lien -
Wrongful lien is void. 
38-9-1. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Interest holder" means a person who holds or 
possesses a present, lawful property interest in certain 
real property, including an owner, title holder, mortgagee, 
trustee, or beneficial owner. 
(2) "Lien claimant" means a person claiming an inter-
est in real property who offers a document for recording or 
filing with any county recorder in the state asser ting a 
lien, or notice of interest, or other claim of interest in 
certain real property. 
(3) "Owner" means a person who has a vested owner-
ship interest in certain real property. 
(4) (a) "Record interest holder" means a person who 
holds or possesses a present , lawful property interest 
in certain r eal property, including an owner, title-
holder, mortgagee, trustee, or beneficial owner, and 
whose name and interest in that real property ap-
pears in the county recorder's records for the county 
in which the property is located. 
(bl "Record interest holder" includes any granter 
in the chain of the title in certain real property. 
(5) "Record owner" means au owne1· whose name and 
ownership interest in certain real property is recorded or 
filed in the county recorder's records for the county in 
which the property is located. 
(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports 
lo create a lien, notice of interest, or encumbrance on an 
owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it 
is recorded is not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another 
state or federal statute; 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judg-
ment of a court of competent jurisdiction in the state; 
or · 
: (c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document 
signed by the owner of the r eal property. 2010 
38-9-2. · $¢ope. 
(1) (al. 'Th_e provisions of Sections 38-9-1, 38-9-3, 38-9-4, 
and 38-9:6 apply to any recording or filing or any rejected 
recording or filing of a lien pursuant to this chapter on _or 
aflef. Maf .5, 1997. 
(b)~The·provisions of Sections 38-9-1 and 38-9-7 apply 
to i:J ll liens of record regardless of the date the lien was 
recorcled or filed. 
(c) No~w-ithstanding Subsections (l)(a) and (b), the 
prov\sions of this chapter applicable to the filing of a · 
notice of interest do not apply to a notice of interest filed 
before. May 5, 2008. 
(2) The provisions of this ch apter shall not prevent a person 
from filing a !is pendens in accordance with Section 78B-6-
1303 or·seekirig any other relief permitted by Jaw. 
(3) This .chapter does not apply to a person entitled to a 
preconstruction or construction lien under Section 38-la-301 
who files ·a lien pursuant to Title 38, Chapter la, P re-
construction and Construction. · 2012 
38-9-3. Councy recorder m ay reject wrongful lien 
. w ithin scope of employment - Good faith 
requirement. 
(1) (a) A county recorder may reject recording of a lien if 
the county recorder determines the lien is a wrongful lien 
as defined in Section 38-9-1. 
(b) If the county recorder rejects a document to record 
a lien in accordance with Subsection (l)(a), the county 
recorder shall immediately return the original document 
together with a notice that the document was rejected 
pursuant to this section to the person attempting to 
record the document or to the address provided on the 
document. 
(2) A county recorder who, within the scope of the county 
recorder's employment, r ejects or accepts a document for 
recording in good faith under this section is not liable for 
damages. 
(3) If a rejected document is later found to be r ecordable 
pursuant to a court order, it shall have no retroactive record-
ing priority. 
(4) Nothing in this chapter shall preclude any person from 
pursuing any remedy pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, Rule 65A, Injunctions. 2010 
38-9-4. Civil liability for r ecording wrongful lien -
Damages. 
( 1) A lien claimant. who records or causes a wrongful lien as 
defined in Section 38-9-1 lo be recorded in the office of the 
county recorder against real property is liable lo a record 
interest holder for any actual damages proximately caused by 
the wrongful lien. 
(2) If the person in violation of Subsection (1) refuses to 
release or correct the wrongful lien within 10 days from the 
dale of written request from a record interest holder of the real 
property delivered personally or mailed to the last-known 
address of the lien claimant, the person is liable to that record 
interest holder for $3,000 or fo r treble actual damages, which-
ever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for 
$10,000 or for treble actual damages, whichever is greater, 
Tab B 

78B-6-1240 JUDICIAL CODE 986 
78B-6-1240. Investment of securities by court clerk -
Accounting. 
The clerk of the court in whose name a security is taken or 
by whom an investment is made, and his successors in office, 
shall receive the interest and principal as it becomes due, and 
apply and invest the same as the court may direct. The clerk 
shall also deposit with the county treasurer all securities 
taken, and keep an account, in a book provided and kept for 
that purpose in the clerk's office, free to inspection by all 
persons, of investments and money received and their dispo-
sition. 200s 
78B-6-1241. Equalization. 
(1) If a partition cannot be made equally among the parties 
according to their respective rights without prejudice to the 
rights and interests of some of them, and a partition is 
ordered, the courts may order compensation made by one 
party to another on account of the inequality. 
(2) Compensation may not be required to be made to others 
by unknown owners or a minor, unless the court determines 
that the ·minor has sufficient personal property to make the 
payment and the minor's and the minor's interest will not be 
negatively affected. 
(3) The court has the power in all cases to make compen-
satory adjustment among the parties according to the prin-
ciples of equity. 2009 
78B-6-1242. Interests of minor - Payment to guard-
ian. 
If the share of a minor is sold, the court may order the 
proceeds of the sale to be paid by the referee making the sale 
to the minor's general guardian or to the special guardian 
appointed for the minor in the action. 2008 
78B-6-1243. Partition - Payment of costs - Enforce-
ment of judgment. 
(1) The costs of partition, including reasonable attorney 
fees, expended by the plaintiff or any of the defendants for the 
common benefit, fees of referees and other disbursements 
shall be paid by the parties entitled to share in the lands 
divided, in proportion to their respective interests, and may be 
included and specified in the judgment. The costs shall be a 
lien on the several shares, and the judgment may be enforced 
by execution against the shares and against other property 
held by the respective parties. 
(2) Iflitigation arises between some of the parties, the court 
may require the expenses of the litigation to be paid by the 
parties to the litigation. 2009 
78B-6-1244. One referee instead of three allowed by 
consent. 
The court, with the consent of the parties, may appoint a 
single referee instead of three referees in the proceedings 
under the provisions of this part, and the single referee has all 
the powers, and may perform all the duties, required of the 
three referees. 2009 
78B-6-1245. Lien for costs and e,q>enses advanced by 
one for benefit of all. 
(1) The court shall allow expenses incurred, including at-
torney fees, in prosecuting or defending other actions or 
proceedings by any one of the tenants in common for the 
protection, confirmation or perfecting of the title, or setting 
the boundaries, or making a survey or surveys of the estate 
partitioned to be recovered by the party incurring the ex-
penses. 
(2) The court shall determine the amounts with interest 
from the date the expenditures occurred. 
(3) The costs shall be: 
(a) pleaded and allowed by the court; 
(b) included in the final judgment; 
(c) a lien upon the share of each tenant, in proportion to 
the tenant's interest; and 
(d) enforced in the same manner as taxable costs of 
partition are taxed and collected. 2008 
78B-6-1246. · Abstract of title - Costs and inspection. 
(1) If the court determines that it was necessary to have an 
abstract of tµe title to the property to be partitioned created 
and the abstract has been procured by a party to the proceed-
ing, the cost of.the abstract, with interest from the date if its 
creation and ·availability for inspection by the respective 
parties to the.action, shall be allowed and taxed. 
(2) lf th_e .sil:istract is procured by the plaintiff before the 
commencem,enl of the action the plaintiff shall file a notice 
with the complaint thal an abstract of the title has been made 
and is available for the inspection and use of all the parties to 
the action:, The notice shall state where the abstract will be 
available f'oi' i~spection. ., 
(3) If the pla'intiff did not procure an.abstract before com-
mencing tb_e action, and a defendant procures an abstract, the 
defendant shall, as soon as it has been directed it to be made, 
file a notii~ · ~n· the action with the clerk of the court, stating 
who is making the abstract and where it will be kept when 
finished. · 
(4) The .. court may direct who may have custody of the 
abstract: · 2008 
78B-6-1247. · Interest on advances to be allowed. 
Any disbursement made by a party under the direction of 
the court ~uring the action shall accrue interest from the date 
it is made·. · 2009 
PART 13 
QUillT TITLE 
78B-6-130L Quiet title -Action to determine adverse 
·claim to property. 
A person may bring an action against another person to 
determine rights, interests, or claims to or in personal or real 
property. 2008 
78B-6-1302. Definitions. 
As used_ in this part: 
(1) "Claimant" means a person who files a notice. 
(2) "Guarantee" means an agreement by a claimant to 
pay an amount of damages: 
· ( a) specified by the court; 
(b) suffered as a result of the maintenance of a 
notice; 
(c) · to a person with an interest in the real property 
that is the subject of the notice; and 
(d) if the requirements of Subsection 78B-6-
1304(5) are met. 
(3) "Notice" means a notice of the pendency of an action 
filed under Section 78B-6-1303. 2009 
78B-6-1303. Lis pendens - Notice. 
(1) Either party to an action affecting the t itle to, or the 
right of possession of, r eal property may file a notice of the 
pendency' of the action with the county recorder in the county 
where the property or any portion of the property is located. 
(2) The notice shall contain: 
(a) the names of the parties; 
(b) the object of the action or defense; and 
(c) a description of the property affected in that county. 
(3) From the time of filing the notice, a purchaser or 
encumbrancer of the property who may be affected by the 
action is considered to have constructive notice of the pen-
dency of the action. 2009 
78B-H-1304. Motions related to a notice of the pen-
dency of an action. 
(1) Any time after a notice has been recorded pursuant to 
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to the court in which the action· is pending to re.'J~ase the 
notice: 
(a) a pa rty to the action; or 
CbJ a person .with an interest in the· reai'; ii;.operty · 
affected by the 'notice. -
(2) A court shall order .a notice released if': 
(aJ the court receives· a. motion to· release ui1tler Sub-
section ( 1 ); and 
(bl the court finds that the claimant has .not estab-
1 ished by a preponderance of' the evidence the probable 
·· validity of the real prope;·ty daim that is the subject Qf the 
notice. 
(3) If a cour t releases a notice pursuant to this section, the 
claimant may not record a nother notice with respect .to the 
same property without approval of the court in which the 
action is pending. 
(4) Upon a motion by any person with an interestin the real 
property that is the subject of a notice, a court may i-equire the 
claimant to give the moving party a guarantee as a condition 
of maintaining the notice: 
(a) any time after a notice has been recorded; and 
Cb) regardless of whether the court has received an 
application to release under Subsection Cl). 
(5) A person who receives a guarantee under Subsection (4) 
may recover an amount not to exceed the amount of the 
guarantee upon a showing that: · · 
(a J the claimant did not prevail on the real property 
claim; and . 
(bJ the person seeking the guarantee suffered damages 
as a result of the maintenance of the notice. 
(6) A court shall award costs and attorney fees to a prevail-
ing party on any motion under this section unless the court 
finds that: 
(a) the nonprevailing party acted with substantial jus-
tification; or · 
(b) other circumstances make the imposition of attor-
ney fees and costs unjust. 200s 
78B-6-1305. Disclaimer or default by defendant 
Costs. 
The plaintiff may not recover costs of the action if: 
(1) the defendant disclaims in his answer any interest 
or estate in the property; or · · · 
(2) allows judgment to be taken against him by refus-
ing to answer. 200s 
78B-<l-1306. Termination of title pending action -
Judgment - Damages. 
If the plaintiff demonstrates a r ight to recover at the time 
the action is brought, but his right terminates during the 
pendency of the action, Lhe verdict and judgment shall be 
according to the fact, a nd the plaintiff may recover damages 
for withholding the property. 20118 
78B-G-1307. Setoff or counte rclaim for improvements 
made . 
lf permanent improvements have been made by a defen-
dant, or persons under whom the defendant claims in good 
faith, the value of the improvements, except improvements 
made upon mining property, shall be allowed as a setoff 01· 
counterclaim against the damages recovered for withholding 
the property. 200s 
7813-6-1308 . Right of entry pending action for pur-
poses of action. 
The court in which an action is pending under this pai·t or 
for damages for an injury to property may, on motion and upon 
notice to either party, for good cause shown, issue an order 
allowing a party the right to enter the property and take 
surveys and measurements including any tunnels, shafts, or 
drifts , even though entry must be made through other lands 
belonging to parties to the action. 200s 
7813:G-1:]09. Order for entry - Liability for injuries. 
Th~ order shall describe the property, and a c·opy ser·ved on 
the owner or occupant. The party may enter the property with 
neces~ary surveyor s and assistants, and may take surveys 
and ·rrieasu·rements. The party shall be liable for · an.v. unnec-
essary injury done lo the property. 2008 
7813-6-1310 .' Mortgage not considered a convey~nce -
Fo1'eclosure necessary. 
A mortgage of real property may not be considered a 
conveyance which wou ld enable the owner of the mortgage ·to .. 
recover possession of' the real property without a foreclosure 
and sale. 200s 
78B-f;-1311. Alienation pending action not to prejudice 
recovery. 
An ·action for the recovery of real property against a person 
in possession cannot be prejudiced by any a lienation made by 
the person; either before or after the commencement of the 
action. 2008 
78B-6-1312. Actions respecting mining claims - Proof 
of customs and usage admissible. 
In actions respecting mining claims proof must be admitted-
of the customs, usages, or regulations established and in force 
in the district; bar, diggings, or camp in which the claim is 
located. The customs, usages, or regulations, if not in conflict 
with the laws of this state or of the United States, shall govern 
any decision in the action. 200s 
78B-6-1313. Temporary injunction in actions involving 
title to mining claims. 
(1) The court may grant a postponement if: 
(a) the court is satisfied that the delay is necessary for 
either or both parties to adequately prepare for t r ial; a nd 
(b) the party requesting the postponement is not guilty 
of !aches and is acting in good faith. 
(2) The court may provide, as part of its order, that the 
party obtaining the postponement may not remove from the 
property which is the subject of the action any valuable 
quartz, rock, earth, or ores. The court may vacate the post-
ponement order or hold the party in contempt if the order is 
violated. 200s 
7813-6-1314. Service of summons and conclusiveness of 
judgment. 
If serv ice of process is made upon unlmown defendants by 
publicatioi1, the action shall proceed aga inst the unknown 
persons in the same manner as against the defendants who 
a re named and upon whom service is made by publication. 
Any unknown person who has or claims to have any right, 
title, estate, lien, or interest in the property, which is a cloud 
on the title and adverse to the plaintiff, who has been served 
as above, and anyone claiming under him, shall be concluded 
by any judgment in the action even though the unknown 
person may be under a legal disability. 200s 
78B-6-1315: Judgment on default - Court mus t re-
quire eviden ce - Conclus iveness of judg-
ment. 
Cl) If the summons has been served and the time for 
answering has expired, the court shall proceed to hear the 
cause as in other cases. 
(2) The court may examine ond determine the legality of 
the plaintiff's title and the title and claims of all the defen-
dants and all unknown persons. 
(3) The court may not enter any judgment by default 
against unknown defendants, but in all cases shall require 
evidence of pla intiff's title and possession and hear the evi-
dence offered respecting the claims and title of any of the 
defendants. The court may enter judgment in accordance with 




§ 30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees - Temporary alimony. 
Utah Statutes 
@ Title 30. Husband and Wife 
Chapter 3. Divorce 
Current through Chapter 437 of the 2014 General Session 
§ 30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees - Temporary alimony 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, Divorce, Chapter 4, Separate Maintenance, 
or Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 1, Cohabitant Abuse Act, and in any action to establish an 
order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic 
case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, 
including expert witness fees, of the other party to enable the other party to prosecute or 
defend the action. The order may include provision for costs of the action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or 
division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon 
determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense. The court, in 
its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party 
is impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1 ), the court may order a party to provide money, during 
the pendency of the action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other party 
and of any children in the custody of the other party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or judgment may be 
@ amended during the course of the action or in the final order or judgment. 
Cite as Utah Code § 30-3-3 
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DEAN C. ANDREASEN (#3981) 
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CLYDE SNOW & SESSlONS 
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Fil.El DISTRICT aoun 
Third Judicial District 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT cou~~f°FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL S. ROBINSON, 
Petitioner, 
V. 
DEBRA J. ROBINSON, 
Res ondent. 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
....... 
Civil No. 07 4900501 
Judge Gle~n K. Iwasaki 
Comm. Michael S. Evans 
On January 13, 2011, the Order to Show Cause of Respondent Debra J. 
Robinson came on regularly for hearing before Commissioner Michael S. Evans. 
Petitioner was present and represented by Steven Kuhnhausen. Respondent was 
present and represented by Dean C. Andreasen and Sarah L. Campbell. Counsel 
informed the Court that the parties had entered into a partial stipulation to resolve 
certain issues of the action. The stipulation was read into the record, acknowledged by 
the parties, and accepted by the Court. With respect to the disputed issues, the Court 






described in-the unofficial transcript of the ruling of the Court, attached hereto as Exhibit 
A. Based on those findings and recommend_ations, it is hereby ordered,. adjudged and 
decreed as follows: 
1. Respondent's Motion to Strike .the· affidavits of John Gottschall and Eric 
Wadley is hereby granted. 
2. Respondent shall manage the Phoenix Plaza and Sandy Retail Center, 
., 
and she shall · continue to manage the Deer Valley condo. She shall be the . one to 
interact directly with· the tenants, secure the deposits and rents, and deposit a11··tunds 
from those rental properties into the parties' joint account. From the joint f;ICcount, 
Respondent shall pay the expenses for the Phoenix Plaza, the Sandy Retail Center, the 
St. George home, and the Deer Valley condo. No other expenses shall be paid from the 
parties' joint account, and Respondent shall provide a monthly accounting to Petitioner. 
3. The parties shall immediately list the Phoenix Plaza property for sale with 
a mutually acceptable agent at a price of $3,000,000. If and when the Phoenix Plaza is 
sold, the sales proceeds shall be placed in an escrow account. 
4. The Sandy Retail Center shall be listed for sale. Michael Carroll is 
appointed as listing agent for the Sandy Retail Center and has authority to determine 
the initial listing price. Any reductions in the listing price shall be agreed to by the 
parties. In making a decision to reduce the listing price, each party may submit to Mr.1 
Carroll up to two expert opinions as to the property's value. 
5. Judgment is entered against Petitioner in favor of Respondent in the 
amount of $438,924.43 representing interest at a rate of eight percent (8%} per annum 
{00197227-1} 
2 
on the amounts owed under the Decree of Divorce c,r 11(8): $1,784,419.00; ,i 12(8): 
@ 
$105,777; 11 15: $22,500) from March 2, 2008 (120 days after the parties· signed the 
Agreement) to January 13, 2011. 
6. The Court-·finds there has been a- prima facie showing of Petitioner's 
failure to comply with and breach of the terms of the Decree of Divorce. . 
7. The· Court finds Petitioner never filed an a·pplication to refinance. 
8. The ·issue of Petitioner's contempt is certified for evidentiary hearing 
~ 
I""-
regardirJg his failure to comply with the terms of the parties' Decree of Divorce. 
9. The issue of attorney fees and costs being awarded to Respondent in 
connection with this Order to Show Cause hearing is· certified for evidentiary hearing 
and shall be considered at the hearing on the issue of Petitioner's contempt. 
1 O. The Court finds the language of the Decree of Divorce does not trigger the 
award of a judgment for the principal amounts involved, which principal amounts are 
due and owing upon the refinance of the property or perhaps as a sanction following. a 
finding of contempt. 




DATED this M_ day of A .1~~~/ 2011 . 
. . BY ;~E COURT: 
MICHAELS. E 
District Court Co 
DATED this 2r-' day of ----"A_'6'd_. __ _ 
APPROV D this .fl_day of 
January 11 
{00197227-1} 
BY THE COURT: 
GLENN K. IWASAKI 
District Court Judge 
4 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE T_'..:.H~:s:.'l:.b,...._ 
DISTRICT COURT, f.ALT LAKE C 
STATE OF UTAH. 
DATE:~l)..L~~~~-ff-~~~~ 
... 
). CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On thi~ day of January 2011, I hereby caused to be served on the 
Petitioner a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT AND ORDER by having 
the same hand· delivered to: 
{0019722M} 
Steven Kuhnhausen, Esq. 
1 O West 300 South, #603 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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DEAN C. ANDREASEN (#3981) 
SARAH L. CAMPBELL (#12052) 
CL YOE SNOW & SESSIONS 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216 
Telephone (801) 322-2516 
Fax (801) 521-6280 
dca@clydesnow.com 
_slc@clydesnow.com 
Attorneys for Respondent 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL S. ROBINSON, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
DEBRA J. ROBINSON, 
Respondent. 
CE: Commissioner Michael S. Evans 
(UNOFFICIAL) PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT 
OF RULING PORTION OF HEARING -
JANUARY 13, 2010 
Civil No. 074900501 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Comm. Michael S. Evans 
SK: Steven Kuhnhausen, Attorney for Petitioner 
DCA: Dean C. Andreasen, Attorney for Respondent 
DR: Debra Robinson 
MR: Michael Robinson 
CE: I'll receive and approve the agreement of the parties as has been stated on the 
record. In regard to the issue of contempt, I will recommend the same be 
certified for further hearing. It appears to me as though, there's been, in fact, 
there's no dispute that a prima facia showing of failure to comply with the Decree 
{00198125-1} 
. ' ~ 
of Divorce has occurred. The Decree provides specifically, and you've read it a 
lot, counsel, but one very specific direction to Mr. Robinson was the "shall file the· 
loan refinance application within 15 days of the date of this Agreement. 11 Mr. . 
Robinson doesn't say he couldn't fil_e the loan refinance application, that it was 
impossible for him to do that. He says he was dissuaded and that's insufficient.. 
And because he didn't take the first step, of course, the other steps resulting in: 
the refinance have never occurred. So again, I will . recommend the issue of. 
. . 
contempt be certified. However, given the language of the Decree, I can't find 
that ~hat would trigger the award ~f a judgment for th~ principal amount involved. 
I will recommend that a judgment for the 8% interest be awarded as that is 
separate and apart an~ _th~re's no dispute that that portion of the Decree has 
been triggered. l'll·recommend that the r~que.$t for fees in connection with this 
. . 
hearing be certified and considered by the Court at the hearing on the is_sue _of· 
contempt. I have reviewed again, in cursory fashion today, the Court of Appeals 
decision, no mention is made of attorneys' fees there, and it's my understanding 
that it's appropriate to request an award of fees of the Court before whom you 
are appearing, so I'll recommend, well, I'll not rule one way or the other, but I'll 
not award attorneys fees that were incurred on appeal. I'm certainly not certain 
where that stand$, but I'll not recommend any be awarded at this time. I believe 
I've addressed all the issues. Hav~ I missed anything counsel? 
SK: No, I think you're done. Oh, my countermotion to go to mediation on those 
unclear paragraphs. 
CE: I can't find there's, the language is, if a term needs to be interpreted they go to 
mediation, I can't find there are any unclear terms that would requ~re mediation, 
not that mediation would be a bad idea to talk about what you do now that 
everything that was contemplated three years ago is no longer in place, as if 
selling the home, but I'm not going to require it. 
{0019812S.1} 
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(ij SK: Okay. 
DCA: What about payments of amounts coming· -c>ut as distributions from the rental 
pr~ceeds; the net rental proceeds after payment of expenses. 
. CE: That was left within the discretion of the parties, was it not? 
SK: · Yes. 
CE: In the Decree? Well, I've awarded a Judgment for the interest amount and I trust 
that you,11 provide the formula you arrive at to Mr. Kuhnhausen that you. apply in 
arriving at the grand total of the interest accrl:Jed from the date of the triggering · 
event to today is my recommendation of, it would appear those proceeds would 
be available for execution if you can't reach some other agreement. 
DCA: May I ask a clarification, then, of the distinction, rm assuming the Court's going 
to have me draft the Order, the distinction between no judgment being entered 
against Mr. Robinson for the principal amounts owing, as compared to the 
interest. What is the distinction? 
CE: The principal amount is due and owing upon the refinance of the property. The 
interest is due and owing upon the lack of refinance of the property. So, the 8% 
is a fixed amount. The other amounts aren't due until the refinance occurs or 
perhaps as a sanction following a finding of contempt. 
DCA: And the Court's findings that he has never filed an application to refinance? 
CE: That was my finding, yes. 
{00198125-1} 
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J I {J 
DCA: Thank you. . 
SK: Thanks ·again for accommodating my schedule .. · 
CE: Thank you. I appreciate counsel, your cooperating together to allow this_ hearing 
to proceed. · And I will a·sk Mr. Andreasen, you prepare the Order. · .Than~ you 
counsel. Thank you folks. Good luck. 
{00198125-1} 
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